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prosecute her claim in bad faith or without reasonable
cause; her actions did not amount to a "contest".
In Black v. Herring, 79 Md. 146, 28 A. 1063 (1894), the
only related Maryland case dealing with such clauses, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that plaintiff did not thwart the
desire of the testatrix or forfeit his right to benefit from
the will by filing a bill in Equity seeking a true construction of the will. See: annotations in 5 A.L.R. 1370, and
49 A.L.R. 2d 205; RoLusoN, WiLLS (1939), 377-383; THOMpSOx, WILLS (3d Ed. 1947) 573-5.

Book Reviews
Modern Criminal Procedure. By Roy Moreland. Indianapolis. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959. Pp. x,
336; with table of treatises, articles and notes, table of
cases, and index. $10.00.
No matter how long he has been practicing, a lawyer
is apt to have a vivid recollection of his first criminal case.
Not necessarily pleasant - but vivid. The drama and the
high stakes involved may help to account for this, but the
newness and strangeness of the task contribute as much
to the powerful and lasting impression made. Such newness and strangeness is in part due to the tendency of
criminal procedure to slip between the cracks of the law
school, curriculum. Treatment of procedural matters in
the course in Criminal Law may be limited to the most
basic matters, with vague promises of more to come.
Teachers of Constitutional Law, Evidence and Civil Procedure often find it comfortable to assume that the student
already knows all about criminal procedure.
Professor Moreland's MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE will
be a good starting point for the law student or puzzled
young practitioner whose legal education in this area leaves
something to be desired. There is very little of single volume length in the field,' and so a treatise as useful as this
one is especially valuable. This is a basic text, most useful
if used as an, orientation device and read from beginning
to end in a few sittings. There is no attempt at exhaustive
1

Valuable single volume works are

AMERTCAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930) ; ORFELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO
APPEAL (1947) ; PERKINS, ELEMENTS OF POLICE SCIENCE (1942).
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citation of authorities or painstaking collection of local
distinctions and deviations. The book presents the important doctrines of criminal procedure in their historical
settings and summarizes existing law, treating some of the
important cases in considerable detail. (It is planned to
issue pocket parts as required by developments in the
law.) Furthermore, as the author promises in his preface:
"In every instance the rule is either justified in the light
of present social needs or a change is suggested." It should
be useful to the interested and intelligent layman as well
as to the inexperienced practitioner and the law student.
The book is divided into five parts, dealing in turn with
arrest problems, obtaining evidence, proceedings prior to
trial, trial and appeal, and sentencing. The parts are further divided into 22 chapters,2 running from 7 to 35 pages
in length.3 The core material of criminal procedure is
present in the book. To some extent the question of what
should be included and what left out reduces itself to a
matter of personal taste. This reader missed, in particular,
a chapter on the scope of review of the judgments of trial
courts by way of direct appeal and such collateral proceedings as habeas corpus. Also, the brief discussion, in connection with the state's right of appeal, of the topic of
double jeopardy (pp. 277-278) seems insufficient. Some
treatment of territorial jurisdiction, entrapment, and the
emerging problem of furnishing indigent appellants with
trial transcripts would be welcome. On the other hand,
the essentials of the problems surrounding the grand jury,
indictments and informations, and the right to an impartial
tribunal could perhaps be presented more concisely.
The author tells us not only what the law is, but what
he thinks it ought to be. He consistently prefers the protection of civil liberties to "efficient" police methods in
' The chapter headings are: Arrest Without a Warrant; Arrest With a
Warrant; The Use of Force in Effecting or Resisting Arrest; Questioning
of Private Persons Without Arrest; Self-Incrimination; The "Third Degree"; Search and Seizure; Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through
Unreasonable Search and Seizure; Wire Tapping and Other Scientific Devices for Obtaining Evidence of the Commission of Crime; Preliminary
The Inferior Court
Examination; Courts of Summary Jurisdiction System; Right to Counsel Prior to Trial; The Right to Bail; The Grand
Jury; The Short Indictment and/or Information; Right to Counsel During Trial and Thereafter; Right to an Impartial Tribunal; Essentials of
a Fair Trial; Right of Appeal by the State; Existing Sentencing Procedures; Reform of Sentencing Procedures; Parole.
8 Some of the chapters have further subdivisions marked by boldface
headings in the text. It would be an improvement to expand and make
more consistent the system of subheadings and 'to reproduce them in the
table of contents and again at the beginnings of the appropriate chapters.
In a work of this sort, such a thing is at least as useful as an index.
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arrests, gathering evidence, and the like, wherever there
is any conflict between the two. He favors the rule which
excludes evidence obtained by improper police methods
on the ground that this is the only practical way to force
police compliance with the maxims of fairness we like
to think we live by. (He also thinks [ch. 13] that the states
should be constitutionally required to adhere to such a
rule.) He goes so far as to advocate the British preferred
practice of not interrogating an accused person at all after
arrest, except perhaps in the presence of his own counsel
(pp. 96-97). He thinks that counsel should be provided for
the indigent accused whenever conviction carries a danger
of imprisonment (p. 228). Before arrest, incidentally, he
would follow the strict rule of the common law in allowing no general police right of detention for questioning,
even for the compromise two hour period suggested in the
Uniform Arrest Act (p. 55). He is unfriendly to the police
officer who uses fatal force necessary to effect an arrest,
at least when the crime for which the arrest is made is
something less than an atrocious felony (pp. 28-41).
However, it would be unfair to characterize Professor
Moreland as the felon's friend. He favors, although he is
somewhat doubtful, the view that the law should not always require a search warrant when a police officer receives immediate sense impressions of the commission of
a crime (p. 114). He is critical of the lax bail provisions
existing in many places (ch. 13), and is doubtful of the
wisdom of the Supreme Court's whittling away of the
trial judge's contempt powers (pp. 258-259). He would
allow conviction by a less than unanimous jury in some
cases (p. 243), would favor the right of the state to appeal
in a criminal case (pp. 280-282), and would give increased
recognition to the danger to society in undiscriminating
release of convicts on parole (pp. 314-317).
Any opinions on criminal procedure invite argument.
The questions are almost all troublesome ones, involving
possibilities of conflicts among such important goals as
privacy, tranquillity, economy, efficiency, safety, fairness,
and absence of brutality. The author recognizes this, but
he does not hesitate to make decisions on the specific problems before him and to argue forcefully for his point of
view. Indeed, a principal virtue of Professor Moreland's
book is that it manages to combine a candid and outspoken
statement of the author's not always middle-of-the-road
position with a fair and detailed presentation of the policy
arguments on all sides of the difficult problems involved.
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The reader need not fear that important considerations
which do not happen to support the author's thesis are
being suppressed. The author's method of argument is,
in general, admirable. He marshals his sources, presents
his arguments, and states his conclusions carefully. Usually
his presentation is concise. Almost always it is clear.
Occasionally, however, there is a tendency to present
the things to be said on both sides of the question and then
state a conclusion without any very clear explanation of
the detailed reasoning which led to the conclusion. For
example, in the chapter on wire tapping (ch. 9), he takes
the position that the dangers in the practice to personal
liberty are so great that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
ought to be construed to prohibit it. This conclusion is
grounded on careful consideration of the extent to which
public and private wiretapping is actually being used, unresolved problems of construction of the Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 605, and the sorts of dangers
which wiretapping is invoked to meet, as well as a historical and analytical treatment of the constitutional background. The author believes that police diligence and ingenuity should prove sufficient to meet the problem without using a device which seems to endanger civil liberties.
Up to this point the argument and the grounds upon which
the conclusion of the author rests are clear - whether
the reader agrees with the conclusion or not.
But the author then dismisses without explanation 4 a
proposal that wire tapping be permitted under a prior
specific court order based on probable cause. His conclusion that the proposal is unsatisfactory may be correct,
but, if it is, it cannot be demonstrated without estimating
and evaluating the probable amount of interference with
individual privacy which would occur, the benefits likely
to be obtained, and the problems of administration involved. These themes can be picked up in the earlier parts
of the chapter, but the merits of "licensed" wire tapping
are never considered with specific reference to them and it is much easier to argue that unrestricted wire
tapping is bad than it is to argue against a tap authorized
by specific court order.
I There Is a somewhat questibn-begging Senate speech, characterized as
brilliant by the author, which takes the position that there can be no
compromise with the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and that there can
be no effective safeguards in wire tapping. There Is no attempt by the
author to define essential terms or to demhnstrate Ithe truth of the latter
proposition.
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Sometimes, an argumentative technique may ruffle the
reader. Compare, for example, his attitude toward judicial
law making when he likes the result, and when he does
not:
"The chief value of the decision, lies in the obvious
attempt of the judge to make a manslaughter verdict
possible. While the second part of the instruction
may be interpreted to give effect to the rule under
discussion, the third part gives an opportunity to the
jury to evade it. It is clear that the facts of the case
call for a conviction of murder, if the rule were applied as ordinarily stated. It is by such a judge, with
such instructions, with such a jury, that obsolete law
is sloughed off" (pp. 42-43).
"As Justice Frankfurter puts it, what was a mere
hint in the Weeks Case became a suggestion in the
Carrolldecision, was loosely turned into dictum in the
Agnello Case, and finally was elevated into decision
in the Marron,Harrisand Rabinowitz Cases. It is from
such fragile and unstable sources that poor law often
comes" (p. 122).
But trivial flaws, so dear to the heart of the reviewer,'
should not obscure the solid merits of the work. It is
clearly written, convenient in length, and thought-provoking in content. Perhaps its greatest merit is that Professor
Moreland has managed to present facts and arguments so
fairly that the reader is encouraged to think for himself
and to test his own conclusions against those of the author.
JOHN

M.

BRUMBAUGH*

5There is also, at pp. 241-242, a depressing and lengthy allegory taken
from WIGMORE, in which, in the course of ezamining the arguments on
the question of abolition versus reform of the jury system, the otherwise
great man, in a flight of lead-winged whimsy, compares the jury system
to a watch. (It begins: "A Man came to a Jeweler's Shop with a Watch,
and said: 'I want one of those new Swiss Watches that I saw advertised.
This is my old Watch, a Walginson 'Perfecto; I bought it for $500 in New
York in 1914. But lately it has been going to Pieces. It runs down every
Week or so. I cannot make it Go. It is a Failure ....
') The passage
is reminiscent of something of George Ade's with the humor removed. A
valid point is bludgeoned to death.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School.

